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THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LYING: UNDER WHAT 
CIRCUMSTANCES, IF ANY, SHOULD LIES BE MADE 
CRIMINAL? 
 
Bryan H. Druzin and Jessica Li** 
 
This paper argues that lying should be a crime. In doing so we propose the 
creation of a wholly new category of crime, which we term “egregious 
lying causing serious harm.” The paper has two broad objectives: the first 
is to make the case why such a crime should even exist, and the second is 
to flesh out how this crime might be constructed. The main contribution of 
the paper lies in the radical nature of its stated aim: the outright 
criminalization of certain kinds of lies. To our knowledge, such a proposal 
has not previously been made. The analysis also contributes to a broader 
discussion regarding the issue of overcriminalization. We conclude that 
while criminalizing certain forms of lies might at first blush appear 
fanciful, the case for doing so is not only plausible, it is indeed necessary.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are a resident in an apartment complex. Your neighbor (call 
him Bartley) knocks on your door one day and informs you that your infant 
child has been crushed to death by the elevator on the first floor. Gripped 
with fear, you rush downstairs in a state of frenzied panic, your heart 
pounding in your chest, only to discover that the nightmare described by 
Bartley is a work of fiction. Your child is fine. What Bartley just told you 
was a lie designed to terrorize you. Suppose Bartley repeatedly does this to 
people, deriving some perverse pleasure from it. The question this paper 
will pose is a simple one: should Bartley’s conduct be a crime? The answer 
this paper puts forth is “yes.” The above example, exaggerated as it is, will 
serve as the focal point of the discussion which follows, as we assert that 
while this scenario may give rise to certain tortious liability (i.e. the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress1), Bartley’s conduct, in that it 
causes serious harm, should receive the full attention and sanction of the 
                                               
 Visiting tutor at King’s College London, Lectuer in law, Brunel University 
** LL.B., Cambridge University and trainee at Clifford Chance LLP London. 
Special thanks to Professors Andrew von Hirsch and Dr Antje du Bois-Pedain at 
Cambridge University for their contribution to the theoretical direction of this paper. 
1 The basic elements of which are: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) 
the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the act is the cause of the distress; and (4) the 
plaintiff suffers severe emotional distress as a result of the defendant’s conduct. See 
Wilkinson v. Downton, (1897) 2 Q.B. 57. 
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criminal law. What Bartley did should be a crime—and yet it is presently 
not a crime.  
There is a long-standing and powerful moral principle which maintains that 
lying is wrongful conduct. It should not be too controversial of an assertion 
to state that all well-socialized people revere honesty and disapprove of 
lying and other forms of deception.2  And yet, it is also a truism that 
everyone lies. Dishonesty appears to be a pervasive feature of human 
interaction. The average person does not kill, rob or rape, but she does lie, 
and she lies often. Friends lie to friends to be polite; students lie to their 
professors about missed assignments; husbands lie to their wives about their 
whereabouts when in fact they are having affairs; teenagers lie to their 
parents about the friends they keep—we even lie that we feel fine when we 
do not. Our relatives lie; our co-workers lie—and we lie to them. And so 
while the reader’s immediate reaction to Bartley’s behavior is likely 
revulsion and a sense that he deserves some form of punishment, we may 
yet remain uneasy with the notion of criminalizing Bartley’s conduct. This 
mismatch between the ethical prohibition against lying and the criminal 
law’s general reluctance to sanction such conduct will be the central focus 
of the paper as we attempt to negotiate a distinct set of circumstances where 
lying should in fact be criminalized. This paper does not assert that all lies 
should be criminalized; rather it proposes that certain lies in certain 
circumstances should be made criminal—lies which are explicitly intended 
to cause uniquely serious harm, and where such harm results. 
Indeed, we can envision many other scenarios involving lying that do not 
have any tort equivalent, whereby “serious harm” may go beyond physical 
or mental distress to include loss of opportunity, loss of liberty, or other less 
easily defined injuries. For instance, consider a scenario in which an 
indiviudal maliciously lies to an orphaned child that her parents, who the 
indiviudal knows, are deceased, when in fact they are alive and desperately 
searching for the child.3 What is the crime exactly? Consider a situation 
where a woman deceives her lover into impregnating her by lying to him 
regarding her use of birth control. This man involuntarily fathers a child as a 
result. Imagine the situation is reversed and the woman is involuntarily 
impregnated. What is the harm? What of a woman who falsely claims to 
have had sexual relations with a man solely to destroy his marriage and 
family?4 Does not a very serious harm result from this lie? Consider a 
                                               
2 Note that “lying” and “deception” are used interchangeably in the first portion of the 
paper. There are, however, distinct differences between the two forms of behavior and this 
will be explained in greater detail in the latter half of the paper. 
3 We assume the individual owes no duty of care to the child.  
4 Though there may be an action in defamation here, but it is highly unlikely that such a 
scenario would give rise to criminal defamation. See Part I. section B below 
(“Defamation”).  If the genders in our scenario were reversed this could be a misdemeanor, 
for instance, under an archaic Floridian law. See Fla. Stat. § 836.04 (“Whoever speaks of 
and concerning any woman, married or unmarried, falsely and maliciously imputing to her 
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scenario in which an indiviudal jealously conceals her roommate’s 
admissions letters to medical schools, telling the roommate instead she was 
rejected from all the schools to which she had applied.5 In fact, one can 
conceive of many scenarios in which lies cause considerable injury that 
existing laws simply fail to capture, or capture improperly. There is little 
question that such harms do occur, and quite likely occur frequently; 
however, as they are not criminalized nor have produced any body of case 
law, these incidents go unnoted and unpunished. 
While the idea of criminalizing lying may seem at first blush somewhat 
radical, it is not so far-fetched when we consider that lying is already 
criminalized in many contexts, such as perjury, criminal libel, the making of 
false statements, etc. This paper asserts that it would in fact be logically 
inconsistent to not extend this same proscription to circumstances involving 
the exact same conduct causing an equal or greater measure of harm. This 
paper will argue the case for criminalizing lying in certain exceptional 
circumstances that are not presently captured by our criminal law. But these 
are, the reader might object, private interactions that should remain beyond 
the purview of our laws. To criminalize such behavior, the reader may 
protest, would be an unacceptable, and perhaps even dangerous intrusion 
into the private sphere. There may be a great deal of validity to this 
objection. Indeed, there may be strong public policy reasons against 
criminalizing lying; however, there are also, as we will show in the 
discussion that follows, compelling reasons to extend the law to such 
conduct. The present inability of the law to protect individuals from such 
harms does not justify its failure to do so, nor imply that the criminal law 
should sit on its hands and not criminalize such objectionable and injurious 
conduct. This paper will advocate for the criminalization of certain 
exceedingly egregious forms of lying. In doing so, we will propose the 
creation of a wholly new category of crime, which we will call: “egregious 
lying causing serious harm.” The paper has two broad objectives: the first is 
to make the case why such a crime should even exist, and the second is to 
flesh out how this crime might be constructed.  
To do so, we will borrow some key concepts proposed by the political 
theorist Joel Feinberg. An examination of Feinberg’s principle of 
“mediating maxims” will demonstrate that the crime conceived of in this 
paper does not just broadly violate his “harm principle,” but fulfills the 
parameters as set out by Feinberg of the kind of conduct that the state may 
rightly make criminal. The contribution of this paper lies in the radical 
nature of its stated aim: the outright criminalization of certain kinds of lies. 
To our knowledge, such a proposal has not previously been made. If by the 
                                                                                                                       
a want of chastity, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree . . .”). However, this 
would entail a punishment hardly commensurate with this level of harm. 
5 The individual might be charged with obstructing her roommate’s mail, a felony 
punishable by a fine or up to six months imprisonment (18 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)), but such 
a reprimand does not really redress the harm, nor is it an appropriate label for her conduct. 
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conclusion of the discussion the case for criminalizing lying appears at least 
conceptually plausible, then the aim of this paper will have been met. 
The paper proceeds in two parts. Part I examines how and indeed if lying is 
an intrinsic wrong, and assesses the arguments offered by moral 
philosophers. The notion of criminalizing lying should not be such a great 
affront to our sensibilities as lying is already regulated to varying degrees in 
both criminal law and tort, along with other areas of the law. A summary of 
this law is provided. There are very compelling reasons as to why the 
criminal law has been reluctant to extend its coverage and protection to 
victims of lying; these arguments are also assessed. Part II then advances 
the proposition that the criminalization of lying may indeed be justified in 
certain narrow contexts. The second half forms the meat of the paper. Here 
we construct a wholly new crime, fleshing out its elements and teasing out 
the implications of what most likely will be received as a somewhat radical 
proposal. Indeed, the criminalization of certain forms of lies might initially 
appear fanciful; but it is the aim of this paper to not only establish the 
plausibility of this position, but argue the necessity of legislatively 
constructing such a crime. 
 
 
 
I.   WHY CERTAIN FORMS OF LIES  SHOULD BE CRIMINALIZED: 
THE LAW’S PRESENT APPROACH TO LYING 
A.  The Moral Dimensions to Lying 
We choose an intuitive place to begin our discussion: the idea that it is 
wrong to lie—the refrain of every scolding mother, and perhaps the first 
moral truth learned by each of us as a child. To properly contextualize our 
subject we must begin by examining its moral dimensions. For this, some 
preliminary mapping of the philosophical landscape underpinning lying is 
required. Let us start by first defining what it is exactly we mean by a lie. 
Philosopher Arnold Isenberg has proffered a definition of a lie that will 
serve the purpose of this paper. His definition of a lie is “a statement made 
by one who does not believe it with the intention that someone else shall be 
led to believe it.”6 While lying is widely condemned as wrong, the 
                                               
6 Arnold Isenberg, Deontology and the Ethics of Lying 24 PHIL. & PHENOM. RES. 463, 
466 (1964). Interestingly, Isenberg goes on to assert that the preconceived notion that a liar 
necessarily intends to deceive the listener is erroneous; that is, one may lie without wishing 
to be deceptive towards the listener. The intention on the part of the speaker is essential. If 
the speaker lacks the intention to make another believe what he does not believe himself, he 
is not lying. So, for example a mistaken utterance is not a lie and the utterance of a 
statement that the speaker knows to be false need not be a lie if the speaker is aware that the 
addressee is of sound intelligence and would not believe the statement—the use of sarcasm 
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reasoning behind this moral prohibition differs dramatically. Leading 
arguments contend that lying is either an absolute wrong in itself, or that the 
harm that it engenders is severe enough as to warrant its prohibition. These 
divergent views are represented by the two warring camps of Deontology 
and Consequentialism: the first focuses upon the act itself; the latter, the 
consequences that flow from the act.7 Thus, Deontology would hold that 
lying is inherently wrong, while Consequentialism would say that lying is 
wrong because of its harmful consequences.  
There are more finely nuanced approaches to criminalization that could also 
be examined: ones rooted in libertarianism, economic analysis, 
utilitarianism, and contractarianism, for instance.8 However, it seems that 
these theories, as different as they are, ultimately adhere to, and are 
subsumed by what is either a deontological or consequentialist position. 
Thus we will concern ourselves here simply with these two broad 
conceptual approaches. We should make it clear from the outset that this 
paper vigorously rejects the first and embraces the second. The thesis of this 
paper—the criminalization of lying—is not rooted in any kind of 
deontological view of lying as implicitly wrong; rather, the argument which 
follows hinges entirely upon the harm that certain lies produce. Before 
rejecting it outright, however, let us look briefly at the deontological 
position; indeed, to understand something, it often helps to first understand 
clearly what it is not.  
 
                                                                                                                       
might be an example of this. id. For those of a more ecclesiastical bent, St. Augustine offers 
a similar definition: “saying of what one knows to be false in order to deceive.” RANDAL 
MARLIN, PROPAGANDA AND THE ETHICS OF PERSUASION 142 (2002). Other 
prominent names have proffered definitions. Immanuel Kant defines a lie as "an intentional 
untruthful declaration to another person." SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 286 (1979); Benjamin Constant and Hugo Grotius argue 
that a lie should be defined as “an intentional untruthful declaration to another person who 
has the right to the truth.” Joseph Betz, Sissela Bok on the Analogy of Deception and 
Violence, 19 THE JOURNAL OF VALUE INQUIRY 217, 217 (1985). 
7 In short, Deontology is the belief that “there are certain acts that are wrong in 
themselves.” KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, DEONTOLOGY, RESPONSIBILITY, 
AND EQUALITY 15 (2005). Deontology is perhaps best understood in contrast to 
consequentialism, the theoretical underpinning to utilitarianism, which holds that what is 
“morally right or wrong to do depends upon what would bring about the best consequences 
. . . Moral values, consequentialists believe, are ultimately instrumental, consisting in the 
promotion of values that, because they are prior to morality, are ‘nonmoral’.” STEPHEN L. 
DARWALL, DEONTOLOGY 1 (2003). Deontologists believe that certain acts are 
categorically wrong irrespective of their consequences. Perhaps the most well-known 
advocate of this position is Immanuel Kant, discussed below. 
8 For a good analysis of two of these approaches to criminalization, economic analysis and 
utilitarianism (as well as legal moralism) see DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 180-205 (2008).  
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1. Augustine, Aquinas, and Kant 
The strictest deontological theories hold that lying is an intrinsic wrong. 
Both St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, inspired by Aristotle, 
maintained that lying is contrary to the laws of nature.9 According to them, 
motive and consequence aside, to assert what one does not believe is 
inescapably sinful.10 Emmanuel Kant famously held that lying, defined as a 
false assertion, is absolutely wrong under all circumstances.11 In his view, 
the liar “throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity as a human 
being.”12 Lying constitutes an offence to all of humanity and perhaps more 
importantly, it defiles the liar herself. Kant gave the famous example of a 
murderer asking for the whereabouts of his intended victim. In Kant’s view, 
even in such extreme circumstances, it would be wrong to lie. One should 
reveal the whereabouts of the victim, as lying to the murderer would be 
categorically wrong.13 Indeed, a somewhat startling conclusion, but Kant’s 
point is clear. 
 
2. Other Deontological Arguments: Hobbes and Rawls 
Some scholars have put forward an inventive linguistic argument against 
lying: since by definition, an assertion implies truth, the utterance of a lie 
violates a universal and constitutive rule of language use and hence is 
always wrong.14 Other lines of argument locate the wrong of lying in the 
assault that it perpetrates on the victim’s autonomy. This follows from the 
notion that a lie distorts the reasoning process of the victim, interfering with 
her rational deliberation; the lie robs one of her ability to make rational 
choices concerning her beliefs and course of conduct—it is an assault on her 
integrity as an individual.15 The victim’s will and actions are displaced and 
manipulated according to the speaker’s ends.16 This level of interference “is 
presumptively wrong in ways that cannot be rebutted by considerations of 
personal gain.”17 
Central to this deontological concern with autonomy is the notion of 
voluntariness.18 For instance, consider a lie regarding the contents of a 
                                               
9 Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, Deception in Morality and Law, 22 LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 393, 397 (2003). 
10 id. 
11 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 182 (Mary Gregor ed., 
1996) (1797). 
12 Id. 
13 Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 9, at 398. 
14 Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 9. 
15 Alan Strudler, Incommensurable Goods, Rightful Lies, and the Wrongness of Fraud, 146 
U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1546 (1998). 
16 Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 9. 
17 Strudler, supra note 15. 
18 Strudler, supra note 15, at 1547. 
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liquid which A tells B to serve to C, say a glass of wine. A knows that the 
wine contains a poison but tells B that it is fine and insists that he serve it to 
C. B may poison his guest, but does not do so voluntarily. A’s lie thus 
renders B’s action involuntary.19 In this context, the liar simply 
demonstrates no respect for the victim’s capacity for self-governance. This 
line of argument is often attributed to Kant and has been developed further 
by several Kantians. These scholars do not offer many exceptions to the 
principle that lying is wrong, save on paternalistic grounds (it is in the best 
interests of the lied to) or where a lie may be used to defend the innocent.20 
In this view then, the false belief generated by the lie is the harm itself, and 
no further effects beyond this such as a victim suffering is required.   
Yet another strand of argument asserts there is a duty of fair play that cannot 
go ignored as we all, to a certain extent, depend on others to tell the truth.21 
This fair play duty has its origins in Hobbes’s conception of the social 
contract and was more recently articulated by the political philosopher John 
Rawls:  
Suppose . . . that the benefits produced by cooperation are, up to 
a certain point, free: that is, the scheme of cooperation is 
unstable in the sense that if any one person knows that all (or 
nearly all) of the others will continue to do their part, he will still 
be able to share a gain from the scheme even if he does not do 
his part. Under these conditions a person who has accepted the 
benefits of the scheme is bound by a duty of fair play to do his 
part and not to take advantage of the free benefit by not 
cooperating.22  
And so in a society where the vast majority have the proclivity to tell the 
truth, liars become free-riders as they can elect to benefit from their lies at 
the most optimal times. This line of argument hones in on the harm that lies 
cause to society writ large in that they sever the vital network of trust that 
supports human interaction.23  
 
                                               
19 It may be reasoned that it is primarily lies which successfully convinces its victim that 
actually undercut voluntariness; unsuccessful attempts at lying, where the intended victim 
does not believe the liar will generally fail to undermine autonomy. Strudler, supra note 15, 
at 1548. 
20 Strudler, supra note 15. Some autonomy theorists reluctantly embrace the idea that lying 
may be justifiable in certain circumstances such as the situation whereby one protects one’s 
friend from devastating news in order to ensure that they do not say suffer from a heart 
attack. 
21 Strudler, supra note 15, at 1557. 
22 John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 
3, 9-10 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964). 
23 Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 9, at 398. 
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3. Mill, Feinberg, and the Harm Principle 
This brings us at last to the consequentialist camp. From a utilitarian 
perspective, John Stuart Mill argued that lies undermine mutual trust, the 
lack of which “does more than any one thing that can be named to keep 
back civilization, virtue, everything on which human happiness on the 
largest scale depends.”24 Mill offers a consequentialist argument; his 
emphasis rests upon the larger consequences of the conduct. Mill held that a 
general prohibition against lies, subject to a few narrow and well-defined 
exceptions, would best serve the purpose of utility.25 Underpinning Mill’s 
utterance here is his famous harm principle: “That the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”26 Feinberg 
further develops this principle in his rejection of ‘legal paternalism’ and 
‘legal moralism’ as sufficient grounds for criminalizing behavior.27 
Feinberg’s work is particularly important for us as he further refined Mill’s 
harm principle, interpreting the principle in a more nuanced fashion by 
differentiating different types of harms so as to identify the boundaries 
within which the criminal law may legitimately apply. Feinberg’s work 
plays an important role in providing the necessary parameters with which to 
frame the crime of egregious lying. We return again to Feinberg later in the 
discussion when undertaking the task of identifying the degree of harm that 
may justify criminal sanctions. The idea of harm as the basic justification 
for the law’s intrusion into the private lives of individuals forms the 
foundation of the present exposition.28  
With the clear exception of Mill, the arguments highlighted above hew more 
or less to a deontological position in that they focus primarily upon the 
inherent immoral nature of lying. They are respectable arguments; however, 
this paper is not at all concerned with them. The argument presented in this 
paper is far more pragmatic; while recognizing the value of these 
deontological claims, our thesis is not tied up with any implicit moral 
condemnation of lying. Rather, this paper sits squarely in the 
consequentialist camp. As such, the argument that follows is framed in 
relation to the harm produced by the act. Our objective in targeting lies per 
se is not predicated upon any deontological claim to morality, rather it is 
                                               
24 JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 33 (1869). 
25 Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 9, at 399. 
26 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 6 (Bobbs-Merrill 1956) (1859). 
27 See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (1986); JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS 
WRONGDOING (1988). 
28 Besides Mill and Feinberg, for useful discussions of whether the immorality of conduct is 
a necessary condition for its criminal prohibition, see generally H.L.A. HART, LAW, 
LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963); PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
MORALS (1968); MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME (1997); JOSEPH RAZ, 
THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); JONATHAN SCHONSHECK, ON 
CRIMINALIZATION (1994); Larry Alexander, Harm, Offense, and Morality, 7 CAN. J. 
L. & JURIS. 199 (1994). 
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simply to limit the harm that may result from the act—it is not to stamp out 
lies because they are unethical, but merely to deter the more egregious 
forms of it for the protection of individuals and the greater welfare of 
society. This theoretical tack is important, as it will influence how the crime 
of egregious lying is constructed in terms of the elements of the crime and 
so forth.  
The sense that certain acts possess an implicit moral nature is likely 
triggered by witnessing the harm associated with these actions, which then 
elicits the internalization of certain normative perceptions regarding these 
acts. We imbue the act with an intrinsic moral nature, eventually giving rise 
to a deontological-like perception.29 Indeed, this process likely has its roots 
deep in evolution.30 Pre-rational internalization of this kind provides a 
distinct survival advantage in terms of socialization and group cooperation, 
as intuitive associations are more practical and efficient than complicated 
calculations regarding degree of harm.31 In this sense, the entire 
deontological position is arguably no more than an adaptive quality. To 
plunge a knife into a person’s body is the same act whether it be a surgeon 
conducting a lifesaving operation or a murderer. The moral nature of an act 
arises wholly in relation to the consequences that flow from it—taking a life 
as in the case of the murderer, or saving a life as in the case of the surgeon. 
To reiterate: our aim is not to criminalize lying because it is inherently 
wrong; rather it is to merely prevent the harm that certain lies bring about in 
certain situations. There must be a harm produced, and this harm must be 
particularly grave. If there is any truly objective benchmark for criminality, 
it is this.  
 
B.  The Present Regulation of Lying in the Law 
The idea of criminalizing lying in certain contexts should not appear so 
radical given that the law already prohibits deception in a variety of 
circumstances, in criminal law, contract, constitutional law, and in tort. In 
this section, we will provide an overview of the extent to which the law 
already addresses the act of lying.  
                                               
29 See Bryan Druzin, Law, Selfishness, and Signals: An Expansion of Posner’s Signaling 
Theory of Social Norms, 24 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. (Winter 2010 (forthcoming)) (explaining 
normative internalization as an adaptive quality).  
30 This may explain why certain complicated commercial wrongs that may give rise to 
actions in tort are not readily perceived as having an inherently criminal, immoral element 
to it, although the harm produced may be equal to or even greater than many crimes. And 
conversely, this may also account for why certain crimes, such as tax evasion or white-
collar fraud, do not carry the appropriate feeling of moral wrongness; if the ensuing harm is 
complex and not immediately clear, as it is with say assault or murder, the process of 
internalization does not kick in as readily. Even in the case of a notorious fraudster such as 
Bernard Madoff, the instinctual feeling of culpability is not really commensurate with the 
true extent of the harm he inflicted upon thousands of his victims. 
31 See Druzin, supra note 29. 
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1. Tort 
Misrepresentation is a tort and can create civil liability if it results in a 
pecuniary loss.32 The tort of misrepresentation (also called deceit or fraud) 
primarily covers financial injury. A misrepresentation is a false statement of 
fact that the victim relies upon to their detriment.33  The critical element in 
the tort is the intention to deceive the other party—called scienter.34 The 
speaker must know that “the statement is false, or does not believe in its 
truth, or acts in reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.”35 The speaker 
must also know that the listener is relying on the factual correctness of the 
statement, and this reliance must be reasonable and justified.36 Should a real 
estate developer who owns land falsely advertise it as valuable 
commercially zoned land, this would amount to a misrepresentation; if a 
buyer should purchase the land relying upon the false statement, he may 
have a case against the developer for any monetary losses resulting from the 
purchase. Liability for this tort can be quite wide with the result that 
nondisclosure of material facts by a fiduciary or a doctor or lawyer can 
potentially be caught by this tort. 
Many states even allow a plaintiff to sue for negligent misrepresentation for 
purely pecuniary harms where scienter is technically absent.37 This would 
include situations where the speaker was simply careless as to the truth of 
the statement, such as not taking reasonable steps to verify the statement’s 
accuracy. Traditionally, damages were limited to pecuniary or economic 
injury; however, many courts now allow recovery for damage to property 
and to the person, and in certain circumstances distress, disappointment and 
loss of enjoyment.38 
 
a.    False Pretences 
Related to this is the statutory offence of false pretences, which concerns 
defrauding an indiviudal of their property. It addresses pecuniary loss, 
though this financial injury may take a variety of forms. For instance, the 
North Carolina false pretense statute relates to the taking of “any money, 
goods, property, services, chose in action, or other thing of value with intent 
to cheat or defraud any person of such money, goods, property, services, 
                                               
32 Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. REV. 
455, 474 (1977). 
33 WILLIAM P. STATSKY, ESSENTIALS OF TORTS 291 (2000). 
34 id. at 202. 
35 id. at 292. 
36 id. 
37 id. 
38 id. at 289. 
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chose in action or other thing of value….”39 In common law, false pretences 
is defined as an intentional false representation of fact designed to cause the 
victim to pass title of his property.  
 
b.   Defamation 
Lying is addressed in other forms in tort as well. Defamatory statements can 
incur tortious liability in the form of slander or libel. Defamation is the 
public issuance of a false statement about another party that results in the 
other party suffering some sort of harm. A defamatory statement is one that 
is “calculated to injure the reputation of another, by exposing them to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule.”40 In many jurisdictions defamation is a crime 
as well as a civil wrong.41 Along with substantial fines, the criminal liability 
can be quite serious. For instance, under German law defamation is a 
criminal offence; an offender can be sentenced to a prison term of up to five 
years. Greece, Kazakhstan, and China also allow for sentences of up to five 
years for defamation.42 Under Canadian criminal law, knowingly publishing 
false, defamatory libel is subject to a prison term of up to five years.43 
Under Italian criminal law, certain cases of defamation, broadcasts on 
television, for example, as well as Libel through the press, is punishable 
with terms of up to six-years imprisonment.44 In Moldova, the penalty for 
defamation can be as high as seven years imprisonment.45  
In many authoritarian regimes anti-defamation laws are used to repress 
political opposition or silence journalistic dissent.46 In Central and South 
American jurisdictions anti-defamatory laws, known as Descato (disrespect) 
                                               
39 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-100 (a).  
40 Parmiter v. Coupland, (1840) 151 Eng. Rep. 340. 
41 ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, LIBEL 
AND INSULT LAWS: A MATRIX ON WHERE WE STAND AND WHAT WE 
WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE 1 (2005), 
http://www.osce.org/documents/rfm/2005/03/4361_en.pdf.    
42 id. at 68, 84. For China see GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION, 
CRIMINAL DEFAMATION, 
http://www.article19.org/advocacy/defamationmap/overview.html (last visited May 20, 
2010); see also H. L. Fu, Richard Cullen, Defamation Law in the People's Republic of 
China, 11 TRANSNAT'L LAW 1, 1 (1998) (examining Chinese defamation law). 
43 Criminal Code, RSC ch. C-46, § 298 (1985); Under section 296(1) of the Canadian 
Criminal Code, the publishing of “blasphemous libel” is punishable by up to 2 years in 
prison. It is, however, a defense if the individual can establish that they were “expressing in 
good faith and in decent language, or attempting to establish by argument used in good 
faith and conveyed in decent language, an opinion on a religious subject.” New Zealand’s 
Crimes Act 1961, section 123 also makes blasphemous libel a criminal offence punishable 
by up to a year imprisonment. A similar criminal provision in England and Whales was 
abolished in 2008, replaced by the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006. 
44 Supra note 41, at 78-79  
45 id. at 107.  
46 Fu & Cullen, supra note 42; See also supra note 42. 
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laws, are widespread. Descato laws specifically protect the honor of public 
officials.47 Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela all maintain such 
laws.48 These laws do not even require that the statement is a lie. 
Imprisonment for defamation is commonplace across much of Asia and the 
Middle East, where it is frequently used by government for political 
purposes.49 
In the United States there are no federal laws criminalizing defamation; 
however, criminal defamation laws remain “on the books” in 17 states and 
two territories.50 Although it is not widely used, between 1965 and 2004, 16 
individuals were convicted under criminal defamation statutes in the United 
States, nine of which resulted in sentences of imprisonment.51 The average 
jail time for these sentences was six months, approximately 173.6 days.52 
Other punishments included probation, community service, and fines 
averaging approximately 1,700 USD.53  
In response to spurious civil defamation lawsuits filed specifically to 
intimidate and silence critics by inundating them with burdensome legal 
costs, otherwise known as SLAPP lawsuits (strategic lawsuits against public 
participation),54 many states have enacted anti-SLAPP laws.55 In many 
                                               
47 FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, STEPHEN J. SCHNABLY, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: TREATIES, CASES AND 
ANALYSIS 763 (2006). 
48 supra note 42. 
49 id. 
50 Supra note 41, at 171These states are: Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-13-105); 
Florida (FLA. STAT. § 836.01-836.11); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 18-4801-18-4809); 
Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §21-4004); Louisiana (LA. R.S. 14:47); Michigan (MICH. 
COMP. LAWS § 750.370); Minnesota (MISS. STAT. § 609.765); Montana (MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 13-35-234); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT ANN. § 644:11); New 
Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-11-1); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-47); North 
Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21 §§ 771-
781); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-404); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-417); 
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE 9.58.010); Wisconsin (WIS. STATS. § 942.01), as well 
as the territories of Puerto Rico (P.R. LAWS, tit. 33, §§ 4101-4104), and the Virgin Islands 
(VIRGIN ISLANDS 14 V.I. Code § 1172). 
51 Supra note 41, at 78-79 
52 id. 
53 id. 
54 For a good overview of SLAPP lawsuits, see George W. Pring, Penelope Canan, 
Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs): An Introduction for Bench, Bar 
and Bystanders, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937 (1991) (providing an overview and 
study of the trend). See also GEORGE WILLIAM PRING, PENELOPE CANAN 
SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT (1996); MICHAEL PILL, 
STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (SLAPP): 
SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND LITIGATION STRATEGY (1998). 
55 Nineteen states in the U.S. – California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Washington – have enacted such laws. 
Supra note 41, at 172. 
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cases, “libel, slander and other suits [are] filed against people who would 
[otherwise] testify, protest or speak out at on certain public issues, such as 
zoning and land use issues.”56 These suits are essentially retaliatory lawsuits 
brought by private entities such as real estate developers, politicians, and 
opponents of civil rights and consumers' rights. 
 
c.    Food Disparagement Laws 
In much of the United States, defamation extends even to broccoli. Under 
Colorado state law it is a crime to knowingly “make any materially false 
statement" about an agricultural product.57 An additional twelve other states 
have instituted what is known as food disparagement laws (veggie libel 
laws)58 which effectively make it easier for food producers to successfully 
sue their critics for libel.59 These laws create a cause of action for food 
producers to “recover damages for the disparagement of any perishable 
product or commodity.”60 The elements of the claim under agricultural 
disparagement statutes require the public dissemination of “false 
information”; however, state law varies as to whether the disseminator must 
be aware that the statement is false.61 For instance, Alabama and Oklahoma 
employ a strict liability standard; the only requirement being to make a 
statement actionable is the “dissemination to the public in any manner of 
                                               
56 id. at 173.    
57 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. (Criminal) § 35-31-101 (“It is unlawful for any person, firm, 
partnership, association, or corporation or any servant, agent, employee, or officer thereof 
to…knowingly to make any materially false statement…for the purpose of in any manner 
restraining trade, any fruits, vegetables, grain, meats, or other articles or products ordinarily 
grown, raised, produced, or used in any manner or to any extent as food for human beings 
or for domestic animals.”). 
58 For a concise account of the history of the food libel laws and the corporate effort behind 
them, see SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, MAD COW U.S.A. 17-24, 137-
145 (1997). 
59 These states include: Alabama (ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-620 (Supp. 1995)); Arizona (ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113 (Supp. 1995)); Florida (FLA. STAT. CH. 865.065 (1994)); 
Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. §§ 2-16-1 (Supp. 1995)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE §§ 6-2001 
(1995)); Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:4501 (West Supp. 1995)); Mississippi 
(MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 69-1-253(a) (1995)); North Dakota (N. D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-
44-02); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
TIT. 2, §§ 3011-12); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-10A-2); and 
Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 96.001-.004).  
60 This wording appears verbatim in ALA. CODE § 6-5-620 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 3-113 (West 1995), FLA. STAT. CH. 865.065 (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-1 
(1994), LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4501 (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 69-1-251 
(1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81(A) (1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 
20-10A-2 (Mitchie 1995). 
61 Kevin A. Isern, When is Speech No Longer Protected by the First Amendment: A 
Plaintiff's Perspective of Agricultural Disparagement Laws Symposium: Limitations on 
Commercial Speech: The Constitutionality of Agricultural Disparagement Statutes, 10 
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 233, 239-240 (1997). 
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false information.”62 Florida, Arizona, and Georgia, however, require that 
this be done in a “willful or malicious” manner.63 Food disparagement laws 
were brought to the forefront of public awareness in the case of Texas Beef 
Group v. Winfrey, when Texas cattlemen sued television personality Oprah 
Winfrey for "false defamation of perishable food" and "business 
disparagement" over comments she and a guest made regarding beef safety 
in the wake of the mad cow disease scare.64  
  
2.   Contract Law 
Lying can of course incur liability in contract law in the form of 
misrepresentation. As in tort, a misrepresentation is an unambiguous, false 
or misleading statement of fact or law that is addressed to the party misled, 
which induces the other party to rely upon the misrepresentation and enter 
into a contract.65 Case law defines it as, “a false statement made knowingly 
or without belief in its truth or recklessly careless whether it be true or 
false.”66 Depending upon the type of misrepresentation, the injured party 
can rescind the contract and/or sue for damages. It is interesting that what 
characterizes misrepresentation is the intention to deceive the other party.67 
Mere sales talk or statements of opinion that are false are nevertheless not 
tantamount to misrepresentation.68 The degree to which there is an intention 
to deceive the other party, even where the harm is identical, will determine 
the seriousness of the misrepresentation as evident by the distinction drawn 
between fraudulent, negligent, and innocent misrepresentation. In each, the 
distinguishing feature is the degree to which one party is intentionally lying. 
 
3.    Constitutional Law 
Lying is also addressed under constitutional law. The constitutional 
protection granted to freedom of speech is perhaps the most robust 
                                               
62 ALA. CODE § 6-5-620(1) (1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. § 2-3011(1) (1995). 
63 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-113(A) (West 1995), FLA. STAT. CH. 865.065(a) 
(1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-2(1) (1994). 
64 Winfrey exclaimed that she was "stopped cold from eating another burger." Texas Beef 
Group v. Winfrey, 11 F Supp 2d 858 (ND Tex 1998), aff'd 201 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. 2000). In 
the two weeks after the show, beef prices fell by roughly ten percent and remained 
depressed for eleven months. F. Dennis Hale, Free Speech Rouges and Freaks: An Analysis 
of Amusing and Bizarre Litigants of Free Expression, 25 COMM. & L. 62, 63 (2003). 
65 EWAN MCKENDRICK, CONTRACT LAW 217-218 (8th ed. 2009). 
66 Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 App Cas 337.              
67 For a fascinating analysis of promissory fraud, see IAN AYRES, GREGORY KLASS, 
INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT (2005).  
68See Bisset v. Wilkinson [1927] AC 177 (a false statement of fact is not a 
misrepresentation as to fact); Dimmock v. Hallett (1866) LR 2 Ch App 21 (Puff is not 
considered to be a statement of fact). 
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protection of any individual right under the United States constitution.69 The 
first amendment affords explicit protection to freedom of expression: 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”70 Yet even 
this right is subject to restrictions in certain cases where the speaker is 
deliberately making a false statement.71 For instance, defamatory speech is 
not constitutionally protected. Although "under the First Amendment, there 
is no such thing as a false idea",72 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc. established that first amendment protection does not 
extend to slanderous or libellous statements where the speaker knows the 
information is patently untrue.73 The Supreme Court has made it clear that 
“the Constitution does not provide absolute protection for false factual 
statements that cause private injury.”74 In such cases where actual malice 
can be proven, the speaker may be subject to charges of defamation or 
libel.75 “Actual malice” is present where the speaker was aware that the 
statement was false (or acted with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity 
of the statement), and intends to cause harm by doing so.76 False or 
misleading advertising is also not constitutionally protected.77 The law 
established in the libel decisions in fact suggests that the government may 
take even “broader action to protect the public from injury produced by 
false or deceptive price or product advertising than from harm caused by 
defamation.”78  
 
While hate speech79 is constitutionally protected in the United States,80 this 
is not true in other jurisdictions.81 For instance, in many European 
                                               
69 Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus the Rest of 
the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 377, 379 (2006). 
70 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 2. 
71 See eg., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 
366 U.S. 36, 49, and n. 10 (1961). 
72 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
73 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
74 Va. Pharmacy Bd. V. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 
75 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
76 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Under the New York Penal Code, 
for example, false advertising is delineated under Section 190.20. 
77 Va. Pharmacy Bd. V. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). See also, KEITH 
WERHAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 124 (2004). 
78 Va. Pharmacy Bd. V. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 
79 We bring up hate speech here mainly in the context of holocaust denial. However, with 
many forms of hate speech, despite how reprehensible the statement, it is quite likely that 
the speaker actually believes what they are saying is true. In referencing holocaust denial 
here, we are making the assumption that many such deniers do not actually believe in the 
truth of their position. Such laws are also of interest to us as the law criminalizes the 
statement per se without requiring the presence of demonstrable harm.   
80 See Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative 
Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523 (2002) (looking at the effects of technology on 
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jurisdictions, holocaust denial is a crime.82 In numerous European countries 
legislators have prosecuted individuals for denying the occurrence of the 
genocide of Jews during World War II. For example, laws in Austria, 
Belgium, Switzerland and Germany include the trivialization of the 
Holocaust as a punishable offence.83 In Austria, the crime can be punished 
by up to twenty years in prison.84 No “actual” harm need result from the 
conduct itself as Holocaust denial is viewed as an expression of anti-
semitism and the lie alone (without proven harm) is enough to attract 
criminal prosecution.85 It might be argued of course, that although no 
immediate harm need result from the lie, Holocaust denial does tend to 
encourage and perpetuate anti-semitism amongst its addressees and may 
induce behavior which will result in attacks on Jews.86 
 
                                                                                                                       
United States constitutional protection of hate speech); Paul J. Becker, Bryan Byers, and 
Arthur Jipson, The Contentious American Debate: The First Amendment and Internet-
based Hate Speech, 14 INT’L REV. L. 33 (2000) (examining constitutional protection of 
hate speech in relation to the internet). 
81 See Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of the 
American and European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305 (1998) 
(comparing the protection of hate speech in the United States with foreign jurisdictions); K. 
Boyle, Hate Speech—The United States Versus the Rest of the World, 53 ME. L. REV. 487 
(2001) (placing U.S. protection of hate speech in an interanational context). 
82 All told, sixteen states have legislation that criminalizes holocaust or genocide denial: 
Austria (National Socialism Prohibition Law (1947, amendments of 1992)); Belgium 
(Negationism Law (1995, amendments of 1999) Art. 1-4); Bosnia and Herzegovina; Czech 
Republic (Law Against Support and Dissemination of Movements Oppressing Human 
Rights and Freedoms (2001) §260-261); France (LAW No 90-615 to repress acts of racism, 
anti-semitism and xenophobia (1990) Art. 9, 13); Germany (§ 130 Public Incitement (1985, 
Revised 1992, 2002, 2005); (German criminal code § 189, § 194); Hungary; Israel (Denial 
of Holocaust (Prohibition) Law, 5746-1986); Liechtenstein (§ 283 Race discrimination); 
Luxembourg; (Article 457-3 of the Criminal Code, Act of 19 July 1997); The Netherlands 
(Dutch penal code Article 137c, Article 137d); Poland (Act of 18 December 1998 on the 
Institute of National Remembrance - Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the 
Polish Nation (Dz. U. 1998 nr 155 poz. 1016)); Portugal (Article 240: Religious, racial, or 
sexual discrimination); Romania (Emergency Ordinance No. 31 of March 13, 2002  art. 3-
5); Spain (PENAL CODE- BOOK II, TITLE XXIV Crimes against the International 
Community Chapter II: Crimes of genocide - Article 6071); Switzerland (Art. 261bis); as 
well as the European Union (European Union Framework Decision for Combating Racism 
and Xenophobia (2007)). 
83 Catriona McKinnon, Should We Tolerate Holocaust Denial?, 13 RES PUBLICA 9, 13 
(2007). 
84 Verbotsgesetz 1945 in der Fassung des NSG 1947: § 3g. (“He who operates in a manner 
characterized other than that in § § 3a – 3f will be punished (revitalising of the NSDAP or 
identification with), with imprisonment from one to up to ten years, and in cases of 
particularly dangerous suspects or activity, be punished with up to twenty years 
imprisonment”). 
85 See McKinnon, supra note 83. 
86 id. at 19. 
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4.  Criminal Law 
Of greatest relevance to this paper, however, is that in certain contexts lying 
is a crime. We briefly touched on criminal defamation above; however, the 
criminalization of lies is not confined merely to defamation. Under English 
criminal law, deception is a crime in certain circumstances. This has not 
always been the case as over the years there has been a gradual progression 
towards the criminalization of more acts and forms of deception. Early 
English law was merely concerned with threats aimed at the public at large 
and so punished only specific categories of deception, such as forgery and 
the use of false weights and measures.87 With the advent of the Industrial 
Revolution followed the broadening of fraud offences: the offence of false 
pretences (discussed above) was added to the list of deception offences in 
England in 1757, under a statute which made it a crime to “knowingly or 
designedly” by false pretences to obtain title to “money, goods, ware or 
merchandises” from another person “with the intent to cheat or defraud.”88 
 
a.   Perjury 
But the law has moved on since then and we have seen an impressive 
expansion of the criminal law in this area over the years. Under most 
jurisdictions, perjury and false declarations are considered to be serious 
offences, carrying heavy penalties. Under U.S. law, the federal perjury 
statute requires five basic elements: an oath authorized by U.S. law; taken 
before a competent tribunal, officer or person; a false statement; willfully 
made; as to facts material to the hearing.89 Historically, perjury has always 
been considered a very serious offence: under the Code of Hammurabi, the 
Roman law and the medieval law of France, the act of bearing false witness 
was punishable by death.90 Indeed, the Hebrew bible even makes reference 
to perjury in the ninth commandment that exhorts, “Thou shalt not bear 
false witness against thy neighbour.”91 Modern day attitudes have not 
                                               
87 Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 9, at 405. 
88 Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading and Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform 
the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 185 (2001). 
Although the scope of this crime was considerably broader than the common law crimes of 
cheat and forgery, false pretences remained limited in that it required a false representation 
of an existing fact, rather than merely a false promise, opinion or prediction. So for 
example, to falsely state that a piece of jewellery has been appraised at a stated price 
constitutes a false representation constituting liability for false pretence but falsely 
declaring that the jewellery will appreciate in value over the next year does not incur 
liability.  
89 False declarations is a crime closely related to perjury; it requires that a “false material 
declaration” be made knowingly under oath in a proceeding “before or ancillary to any 
court or grand jury.” Green, supra note 88, at 174. 
90 id. 
91 Exodus 20:16 (King James). The bible also makes similar references to the making of 
false statements elsewhere: “Thou shalt not raise a false report: put not thine hand with the 
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altered: recent studies of attitudes toward crime show that perjury is still 
considered a particularly egregious offence.92 The seriousness of the offence 
stems from the fact that it is an offence against the state, which can usurp 
the power of the courts, resulting in miscarriages of justice. Under United 
States law perjury is a felony and provides for a prison sentence of up to 
five years.93 In the UK, under the Perjury Act 1911, a potential penalty for 
perjury entails an even lengthier prison sentence up to seven years.94 
 
b.   False Statements 
It is also a crime to make false statements to a federal official. The purpose 
of criminalizing such conduct is to “punish those who render positive false 
statements designed to pervert or undermine functions of governmental 
departments and agencies.”95 For the statement to be considered material the 
statement merely needs to possess the "natural tendency to influence or [be] 
capable of influencing, the decision of the decision making body to which it 
is addressed."96 It does not matter if the official is or is not actually misled 
by the statement—the act alone is enough to incur criminal liability. Those 
found guilty of making “any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement or representation” are subject to a prison sentence of up to 5 or 8 
years under federal law (depending on its nature).97 This also includes false 
written statements.98  Interestingly, a bill proposed in the British parliament 
in 2007, the Elected Representative (Prohibition of Deception) Bill, sought 
to make the making of false statements by elected representatives to the 
public an offence—it would be a crime for politicians to lie.99 The bill was 
unsuccessful.  
 
                                                                                                                       
wicked to be an unrighteous witness.” Exodus 23:1 (King James); “You shall not bear false 
witness against your neighbor.” Deuteronomy 5:20 (King James). Other similar references 
include: Exodus 23:6,7 Leviticus 19:11,16; Deuteronomy 19:15-21; 1 Samuel 22:8-19; 1 
Kings 21:10-13; Psalms 15:3 101:5-7; Proverbs 10:18 11:13; Matthew 26:59,60; Acts 6:13; 
Ephesians 4:31; 1 Timothy 1:10; 2 Timothy 3:3; James 4:11. 
92 Green, supra note 88, at 175. 
93 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (2006). 
94 Perjury Act, 1911, C. 6. (Eng.). 
95 United States v. Harrison, 392 U.S. 219 (1985). 
96 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995). 
97 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2006).   
98 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3) (2006). 
99 Under s.1(1) of the bill, the Offence of deception, it would “be an offence for an elected 
representative acting in this capacity, or an agent acting on his behalf, to make or publish a 
statement which he knows to be misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular.” 
Elected Representatives (Prohibition of Deception) Bill, 2007, Bill [162] (Eng.) available 
at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmbills/162/2007162.pdf 
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c.    False impersonation 
False impersonation is also a crime. For example, under New York penal 
law, a person is guilty of this offence if one “knowingly misrepresents his or 
her actual name, date of birth or address to a police officer or peace officer 
with intent to prevent such police officer or peace officer from ascertaining 
such information.” 100 New York penal law also contains the crimes of 
criminal impersonation in the first degree (impersonating a police 
officer),101 and criminal impersonation in the second degree (impersonation 
with the “intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another”).102 Other 
offences involving the making of a false statement under the NY penal code 
include false advertising (S 190.20), and making a false statement of credit 
terms (S 190.55). 
 
d.    Fraud 
Finally, we should look at lying in the form of criminal fraud. In addition to 
being an action in tort, fraud is increasingly the subject of criminal action at 
both the state and federal levels.103 Early in the common law, fraud was 
subject to criminal prosecution only in cases that involved the defrauding of 
the public; acts of fraud between private parties was left entirely to civil 
proceedings.104 But as with other acts of deception the law has increasingly 
sought to criminalize such behavior.  
Fraud is in fact difficult to define as it comes in many flavors; however, the 
basic definition is, "All multifarious means which human ingenuity can 
devise, and which are resorted to by one individual to get an advantage over 
another by false suggestions or suppression of the truth. It includes all 
surprises, tricks, cunning or dissembling (disguising, concealing), and any 
unfair way which another is cheated."105 While fraudulent conduct may be 
quite sophisticated, its core component involves simply the deception of a 
party so as to defraud them of money, goods, or services.106 
                                               
100 NY PENAL LAW § 190.23 (McKinney 2009). 
101 NY PENAL LAW § 190.26 (McKinney 2009). 
102 NY PENAL LAW § 190.25 (McKinney 2009). 
103 DAVID BRODY, JAMES R. ACKER, CRIMINAL LAW, 342 (2007). 
104 Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 736 (1999); see also J.W. 
CECIL TURNER, KENNY’S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 275 (1952) (describing 
fraud targeting the public); CLARK & MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CRIMES § 12.30 (Marian Quinn Barnes ed., 7th ed. 1967) (distinguishing between public 
and private frauds); LLOYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT, 
QUESTIONS 451-54 (5th ed. 1993) (Discussing the historical distinction between public 
and private frauds). 
105 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 468 (5th ed. 1979). 
106 THOMAS J. GARDNER, TERRY M. ANDERSON, CRIMINAL LAW 379 (2008) 
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To be exact, fraud itself is not a defined crime with prescribed elements107; 
rather, “fraud is a concept at the core of a variety of criminal statutes.”108 
Because behavior that constitutes fraud can take a variety of forms, the 
definition of fraud may vary depending upon the nature of the statute that is 
addressing it.109 State and the federal governments have a variety of fraud 
statutes at their disposal to prosecute such conduct. The fraud–related laws 
range from generic fraud statutes, such as conspiracy to defraud and wire 
fraud, which encompass a broad spectrum of fraudulent conduct, to statutes 
that “specifically limit the object of the offense to a narrow range of 
fraudulent conduct.”110 
U.S. law regarding criminal fraud largely mirrors English fraud law known 
generically as deception offences as defined under the Theft Acts.111 The 
Fraud Act 2006 effectively replaced the 1968 and 1978 Theft Acts.112 For 
present purposes, the most pertinent section of the act is s. 2(1) which 
provides that an individual commits the offence where he dishonestly makes 
a false representation and by the making of the representation, intends to 
make a gain for himself or another, or to cause loss to another, or expose 
another to a risk of loss.113 This paper would not profit from a detailed 
explanation of the various elements of this crime but suffice to say that the 
Fraud Act in British law, as with U.S. fraud law, is primarily concerned 
with gain or loss in the pecuniary and proprietary sense and could not 
logically support an extension to any other type of damage or loss.114 In the 
English common law, the crime of conspiracy to defraud is likewise 
concerned entirely with injury of an economic nature.115 To meet the criteria 
for the offence it is necessary to prove that “the conspirators have 
dishonestly agreed to bring about a state of affairs which they realize will or 
                                               
107 This is true under federal law where one cannot actually be convicted for the crime of 
“fraud” per se. However, in some states there are statutes specifically labeled “fraud.” See 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-16-6 (Michie 1978)  
108 Podgor, supra note 104, at 730. 
109 id. at 740. 
110 id. at 734. 
111 id. at 737. See also EMLIN MCCLAIN, 1 TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 669-
70 (1897) (comparing statutes addressing fraud in the United States with those of England); 
ANTHONY ARLIDGE ET AL., ARLIDGE & PARRY ON FRAUD 33 (2d ed. 1996) 
(explaining the definition of fraud under English law). 
112 S.1(1) of the Act states that a person is guilty of fraud if he is in breach of any of the 
sections and they are s.2 (fraud by false representation), s.3 (fraud by failing to disclose 
information) and s.4 (fraud by abuse of position), see Fraud Act 2006. 
113 Carol Withey, The Fraud Act 2006 – Some Early Observations and Comparisons with 
the Former Law, 71 J. CRIM. L. 220, 221 (2007). 
114 The definition of ‘gain and loss’ is found in s.5 of the Fraud Act 2006; ‘gain’ extends 
only to gain or loss in money or other property (including real and personal property) and 
includes gain or loss of a temporary or permanent nature, see id. at 226. 
115 The leading English authority for the offence is Scott v. Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, [1975] A.C. 819. For an overview of the crime of conspiracy to defraud see 
DUNCAN BLOY, DENIS LANSER, PHILIP PARRY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 165-168 (4th ed. 2000). 
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may deceive the victim into so acting, or failing to act, that he will suffer 
economic loss or his economic interests will be put at risk. …”116  The 
understanding of the term defraud here is entirely financial.117 While these 
fraud-related offences successfully capture situations where the deception is 
financial in nature, other forms of injury are left largely unaddressed. For 
instance, the charge of fraud would not apply to the scenarios set out in the 
introduction to this paper. 
Overall there has been a progressive expansion of the criminal law to 
conduct that involves deception. This is evident in the case of many of the 
crimes discussed in this section. The above body of regulation rests upon 
the notion of serious resulting harm, be this pecuniary, administrative, or as 
an assault on an individual’s reputation. The crime this paper will propose is 
also predicated upon the seriousness of harm produced by a lie. As we have 
said, it is not an exercise in moral censure, or a self-righteous incursion into 
the sphere of private morality. It is not comparable to so-called “victimless 
crimes”,118 such as prostitution, gambling, loitering, public drunkenness, 
drug use, speeding or public nudity where there is no harm requirement (in 
the sense of harm to another unconsenting person)—the purpose of the law 
essentially being to prohibit conduct that is deemed intrinsically immoral.119 
As already stated, though a case could be made for it, we are not concerned 
here with the moral blameworthiness of lying; rather we our concerned 
entirely with its consequences—the harm it creates. Indeed, as two scholars 
eloquently put it, “man has an inalienable right to go to hell in his own 
fashion, provided he does not directly injure the person or property of 
another on the way.” 120 
 
 
                                               
116 Lord Goff in R v. Wai Yu-tsang, (1992) 1 A.C. 269.  
117 The one exception to this is where the intended victim is a public servant and the 
intention is to fraudulently interfere with the performance of a public duty. PETER 
GILLIES, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY 109 (1990). In Scott v Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner the English House of Lords made it clear that “a conspiracy to 
defraud designed to prejudice a private person in a way not affecting his financial interest, 
is not necessarily a criminal conspiracy. In both of the opinions appearing in this decision, 
specific reference is made to the need for economic prejudice.” id. at 113. 
118 For an in-depth exposition on the idea of victimless crimes, see E.M. SCHUR, H.A. 
BEDAU, VICTIMLESS CRIMES - TWO SIDES OF A CONTROVERSY (1974); see also 
Alan Wertheimer, Victimless Crimes, 87 ETHICS 302 (1977) (arguing that the argument 
for the decriminalization of victimless crimes is flawed). 
119 Indeed, such laws are at odds with Mill’s Harm Principle. See Mill, supra note 24 (“His 
own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make 
him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right... The 
only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which 
concerns others.”). 
120 NORVAL MORRIS, GORDON J. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE 
TO CRIME CONTROL 2 (1972). 
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C.  Reluctance of the Law to Regulate Lying 
It is evident that over the years, both the civil and criminal law systems have 
become progressively less tolerant of deceitful conduct. Conversely, 
however, it would appear that while the criminal law sanctions lying in the 
public sphere as against the government and fraud which leads to pecuniary 
loss, there are very real limits to the criminal law’s willingness to encroach 
upon private interactions between individuals. And indeed there are very 
good reasons why the criminal law’s regulation of deception is at odds with 
society’s moral positions on the same topic. Before advancing our 
argument, these objections should be considered 
 
1. High Costs of Regulation 
One of the most cogent explanations for the criminal law’s inability or lack 
of desire to regulate lying is that costs associated with regulating deception 
are simply too high. While it may be desirable to eradicate all forms of 
deceptive speech and behavior, given scarce resources, more practical 
considerations must give way as other priorities take center stage. The 
administrative costs involved in fact-finding and dispute resolution fees that 
would be imposed on both the private parties involved and the legal 
institutions charged with adjudication are difficult to justify given the 
already stretched budgets of most criminal law systems.  
 
2.  Superiority of Informal Enforcement 
Another possible explanation for the incompleteness of legal regulation of 
lying is that the legal system prefers to defer the responsibility for regulation 
to more informal social processes—a more spontaneous private ordering 
that utilizes the mechanisms of disapproval and reputation to sanction 
liars.121 Informal enforcement of norms on deception has several advantages 
                                               
121 The literature on spontaneous ordering and norm enforcement is quite fascinating. 
Although by no means a complete list, for a good snapshot of the literature see e.g. R.C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 139 (1991); R.C. Ellickson, The Aim of Order 
Without Law, 150 JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL 
ECONOMICS 97 (1994); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY Vol. 1. 
(1973); JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES 
(1982); Robert Axelrod and William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation 211 
SCIENCE 1390 (1981); Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists 75 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 306 (1981); M. RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF VIRTUE 53 (1996); 
B.L. Benson, Economic Freedom and the Evolution of Law 18 CATO J. 209 (1998); M. 
TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY AND LIBERTY 28 (1982). For a good overview 
of the concept, see Barry Norman, The Tradition of Spontaneous Order 5 LITERATURE 
OF LIBERTY 6 (1982). For spontaneous norm emergence in a commercial context, see 
Bryan Druzin, Law Without The State: The Theory Of High Engagement and the 
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over formal legal enforcement: it sidesteps the institutional and 
administrative costs of legal enforcement by the police and the courts as it 
relies on naturally occurring social phenomena such as gossip, ostracism 
and character signaling.122 Additionally, when the consequences of 
deception do not involve pecuniary loss, social sanctions enforced by other 
people as against the liar may be more effective in the long run and more 
satisfactory to victims. Victims may choose to resort to legal remedies when 
tangible harm is involved but peer groups may in fact be better at evaluating 
the intangible harms of deception and rein in the deceiver by expressing 
their disapproval.123 Although informal enforcement requires community 
oversight of deceptive behavior, such oversight comes naturally as violators 
of behavioral norms will be discovered and punished accordingly. Thus the 
heavy hand of the state need not intrude on a self-correcting social process. 
 
3.  Disinclination to intrude in Private Matters 
Many oppose the idea that the criminal law should govern the conversations 
and social interactions that occur between private individuals. The state is 
generally reluctant to intrude on private matters and preside over words and 
information exchanged between citizens in coffee shops and private homes. 
Such encroachment would represent a massive state intrusion into the 
private sphere. If the criminal law makes it its duty to enforce right speech 
everywhere, no matter how small the lie, regardless of its context or the 
level of harm caused, the consequences would be frightening indeed. First 
amendment issues of freedom of expression would certainly arise, bringing 
in its wake serious constitutional concerns. State intervention of this 
magnitude would begin to look like a police state as its tentacles delve into 
the minutia of human relations. This would seem contrary to the 
constitutional ideals of privacy and personal liberty. 
 
4.  Slippery Slope 
Directly related to the above is the concern about a decidedly “slippery 
slope”—untold danger in allowing the criminal law to sanction lies told 
between private parties in living rooms where even the smallest and most 
innocuous of white lies may become up for grabs. This gives pause in that 
once begun this might initiate a sort of regulatory stampede towards the 
most intimate aspects of individual life. Such government overreach is an 
unsettling prospect.  Indeed, limits upon the expansion of the criminal law 
are, in a sense, a bulwark against state encroachment upon individual 
                                                                                                                       
Emergence of Spontaneous Legal Order within Commercial Systems, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
559 (2010) (arguing that the engaged nature of commerce generates legal norms). 
122 Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 9, at 436. 
123 id. 
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freedom. The law is overcriminalized as it is, their argument would run, 
there is little use in further expanding the criminal law by criminalizing yet 
another form of conduct. 
There is a growing body of scholarship on overcriminalization.124 There is 
broad agreement in the legal community that the justice system is already 
severely overciminalized.125 Some might object to the idea of criminalizing 
lying as exasperating this problem. There are many laws of dubious purpose 
still on the books that epitomize this phenomenon. For instance, depending 
on the state, it is a punishable offence to: sell perfume or lotion as a 
beverage;126 to color birds and rabbits;127 to frighten pigeons from their 
nests;128 and to disturb a congregation at worship by “engaging in any 
boisterous or noisy amusement.”129 Under federal law, it is even a crime to 
place an advertisement on the U.S. flag within the District of Columbia.130 
To be sure, the past several years have witnessed an “explosive growth in 
the size and scope of the criminal law” in the United States at both the 
federal and state level, together with a discernable rise in the use of 
punishment.131 Some scholars like Ken Mann have made it their professed 
goal to “shrink” the criminal law as they advocate a more punitive civil law 
system that would largely mirror the criminal law, thereby reducing the 
need to use criminal sanctions towards punitive purposes.132 Many, like 
him, believe that the gradual expansion of the criminal law is not a 
phenomenon to be applauded, as state encroachment on the daily activities 
of ordinary citizens can be stifling. While the outlawing of all lies might 
fulfill a moral imperative, in reality, it would wreak havoc on society. 
According to this view then, lying is not a wrong that warrants monitoring 
and punishment; certain limitations to the reach of the criminal law should 
                                               
124 For a good introduction to this literature, see Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of 
Overcriminalization; More on Overcriminalization; and The Use of Criminal Sanctions in 
Enforcing Economic Regulations, in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 21, 21–61 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1987); GENE HEALY, GO 
DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST EVERYTHING (2004); 
E.S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005); 
Donald Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit 
Strategies, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1155 (2005); DOUGLAS HUSAK, 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008); Stuart P. 
Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the 
Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997). 
125 Darryl K. Brown, Rethinking Overcriminalization 2 (Bepress Legal Series, Working 
Paper No. 995, 2006).  
126 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 901(6) (2001). 
127 IND. CODE § 15-2.1-21-13 (1998). 
128 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 132 (2002). 
129 NEV. REV. STAT. 201.270(2) (2003). 
130 4 U.S.C. § 3 (2000) 
131 HUSAK, supra note 124, at 3. 
132 John C. Coffee Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Models and 
What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875 (1992). 
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be forcefully erected before the state begins to justify its intercession in such 
an intimate facet of private life. 
 
5.  Benefits of Deception and Lack of Desire to Regulate because Lying is 
Useful 
Another convincing explanation as to why the law tolerates deception posits 
that because deception can in fact be extraordinarily beneficial, the law 
really lacks the desire to regulate lying. Authors such as Diderot, Hegel and 
Neitzsche all revolted against Kant’s categorical and quasi-categorial 
moralism, as they applauded those who wished to have some transformative 
influence on the world.133 Nietzsche once said that the ideal activist is one 
who “lies rather than tells the truth...because it requires more spirit and 
will.”134 While the truth is often the safe and conventional response, it is the 
liar who dares to break convention and who, from this perspective, exudes 
genius and morality.135 Moral philosopher David Nyberg characterizes 
truth-telling as “morally overrated” and emphatically highlights the positive 
contributions that lies and other forms of deception can bring to civil society 
in terms of the protection of privacy and the preservation of emotional 
comfort.136 From his standpoint, because dishonesty features so largely in 
our interactions with one another, it is a basic adaptive skill and can serve as 
means to good ends.137  
While we may abhor lying and those who tell lies, we also accept that 
deception is a fundamental part of our culture and a legitimate and 
necessary means of communication. Consider the conduct of a candidate for 
a job interview who from the very instant he puts on his most dashing suit to 
his bright smile and handshake as he makes contact with his prospective 
employer to his mannerisms and posture throughout the interview and 
perhaps even the exaggerations and lies about his experience and 
educational background—all of this is meticulously crafted to mislead and 
project a confidence and competence that the job seeker does not necessarily 
possess. For some professionals, lying is a fundamental part of their job: in 
order to collect evidence and elicit cooperation, law enforcement officials 
often lie to criminal suspects; physicians and nurses lie to patients to 
alleviate distress; researchers lie to study subjects in order to manipulate 
responses and behavior; politicians and diplomats lie to seize an advantage 
in foreign policy negotiations; and as a duty to their clients, lawyers 
lawfully conceal information that would otherwise disadvantage their 
                                               
133 William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-Categorical Moralism, 12 GEO.  
J. LEGAL ETHICS 433, 450 (1999). 
134 id. at 450. 
135 id. 
136 Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 9, at 399. 
137 Id. 
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clients’ case.138 Indeed, it might be argued that in the adversary system, “the 
very institutional framework of a legal system may be used to hide the truth 
. . .”139 Lying is frequent and truly ubiquitous.140 Studies conducted in the 
U.S. show that the average person tells a couple of significant lies a day, 
and many actually tell even more.141 In fact, it is suggested that those who 
lie either too much or too little strike us as unkind; the perfectly socialized 
person is one who navigates seamlessly between these two extremes.142 The 
ubiquity of lying suggests that it works and that it forms a fundamental part 
of our social existence. Viewed from this perspective, lying is an ordinary 
event which does not deserve nor necessitate the sanction of the criminal 
law. 
The crime of egregious lying causing serious harm would have to take into 
account these objections, and be crafted so as to avoid the reach of all of 
these issues. The ambit of the law would have to be confined to 
exceptionally egregious cases—the severe social harm produced by lies 
properly balanced against the potential hazards in criminalizing lying. While 
one could almost certainly make the case that most lying is immoral, clearly 
not all lies should be made criminal. 
 
D.   The Case for Targeting Lies Specifically  
Indeed, much that is wrong is not criminal, and much that is criminal is not 
morally wrong. There may be practical consequences involved in conflating 
these two realms. As we have already stated, the crime conceived of in this 
paper is not formulated from a deontological basis that condemns lying per 
se, rather its focus is upon the harm that such lying produces. While this 
distinction clarifies the theoretical underpinning to our proposed crime, it 
brings up a key question: if our intent is to mitigate the harm created by lies 
rather than the lie itself, why then single out the act of lying rather than then 
merely the resulting harm? That is, why craft the offence in terms of lying 
                                               
138 Anita L. Allen, Lying to Protect Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REV. 161, 166 (1999). See also 
Alan Ryan, Professional Liars, 63 SOC. RES. 620, 625-41 (1996) (showing that 
politicians, lawyers, and physicians alike all lie in a professional context); Jennifer Jackson, 
Telling the Truth, 17 J. MED. ETHICS 5 (1991) (examining how medical professionals 
lie); JAMES H. KORN, ILLUSIONS OF REALITY: A HISTORY OF DECEPTION IN 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1997) (reflecting on the many ways that social scientists 
deceived their test subjects).   
139 W. Peter Robinson, Lying in the Public Domain, 36 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 359, 
366 (1993). 
140 Bella M. Depaulo et. al., Lying in Everyday Life, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 979, 993 (1996); F. G. BILEY, THE PREVALENCE OF DECEIT 27 (1991); 
DAVID NYBERG, THE VANISHED TRUTH: TRUTH TELLING AND DECEIVING IN 
ORDIANRY LIFE 11 (1993); see also CHARLES V. FORD, LIES! LIES!! LIES!!! THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF DECEIT (1996) (examining the psychological function of lies). 
141 Allen, supra note 138, at 167. 
142 id. 
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per se, rather than prohibiting any conduct designed to cause the targeted 
harm? 
There is some merit to this objection. Indeed, we can see the conceptual 
importance placed upon the idea of harm in terms of the classification of 
specific offences according to the nature and degree of their harmfulness.143 
“Across time and legal cultures, the primary concept around which crimes 
have been classified has been harmfulness.”144 The relevant question 
becomes “who, or what interest, is harmed or sought to be protected.”145  
Categories are therefore typically framed in terms of “the particular type of 
social harm involved, such as (1) offenses against the person, (2) offenses 
against property, (3) offenses against habitation and occupancy, and so 
forth."146 And this extends to the drafting of particular offences. Offences 
often lay out a specific “consequence” to be caused by the action. To be 
sure, harm is “viewed as the ‘linchpin’ of the criminal law, the moral 
element that justifies punishment and…defines criminality.”147 The 
overarching orientation of our laws is directed towards the harm that is 
caused by the conduct.148 Yet an express form of conduct is identified. This 
serves an obvious function: it is vital to break “conduct” down into specific 
acts so as to educate people on just which type of behavior is prohibited. 
Carrying the above objection to its logical absurdity, it is in theory possible 
to jettison the whole of the criminal law and replace it with a single 
provision prohibiting any “conduct causing unjustified harm upon another 
individual or individuals”, the sentencing for which is commensurate with 
the seriousness of the harm produced (this could be expanded to include 
attempts and negligence). But it requires no more than a moment’s 
consideration to see the dangers implicit in instituting such a stunningly 
broad, catchall offence, and the nightmarish scenarios in terms of state 
overreach that would surely ensue. The scope of our laws must be fenced in 
and kept within justifiable limits that are explicitly unambiguous. The 
Supreme Court has made it clear that, “the terms of a penal statute . . . must 
be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on 
                                               
143 Stuart P. Green, Deceit and the Classification of Crimes: Federal Rule of Evidence 
609(a)(2) and the Origins of "Crimen Falsi”, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1087, 
1087 (1973). 
144 id. at 1123. 
145 id. at 1087. 
146 RONALD N. BOYCE & ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 10 (7th ed. 1989). 
147 Green, supra note 143. See also Albin Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of 
Crime: A Comparative Analysis of the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 
DUQUESNE L. REV. 345 (1966) (analyzing the importance of the harm principle in 
different criminal law systems); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique 
of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497 
(1974) (contesting the significance placed upon the harm principle). See also generally 
WILLIAM WILSON, CRIMINAL LAW: DOCTRINE AND THEORY (2008) (providing 
a good overview of criminal law theory). 
148 So called “victimless crimes” being a notable exception. 
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their part will render them liable to its penalties.”149 Acts which are made 
criminal ''must be defined with appropriate definiteness.''150 Thus, offences 
should be tethered to specific acts so as to pinpoint exactly which conduct is 
acceptable and which is not. This is particularly true when dealing with 
harms of a patently amorphous and indistinct nature, such as in the case of 
Bartley’s lie. If we are to step so intrusively into the sphere of private 
activity, we must do so with extreme caution, constraining the reach of 
criminal regulation to a very narrow and well-targeted form of conduct. 
Criminalizing forms of lying allows for the effective and positive expansion 
of the criminal law in a restrained manner.  
In certain cases, the harm is great enough to warrant criminal sanctions; 
however, the nature of this harm may be difficult to define precisely as it 
may take a variety of forms. For instance, under New York penal law, 
Bartley’s lie would not fit into any defined crime; were it a course of 
conduct, Bartley could only be charged with the very minor, non-criminal 
offense of 2nd degree harassment under section 240.26 of the New York 
Penal Law. The act of lying is instrumental in causing these harms. Zeroing 
in on the act of lying is thus a reasonable and sensible way to regulate a 
serious harm that would otherwise be difficult to target without incurring 
the danger of legislative overbreadth. Therefore, here, the targeted harm is 
fixed to a very narrowly defined action—lying.   
The act and the resultant harm can in a sense compensate one another so as 
to avoid legislative ambiguity. If, for instance, the targeted harm is 
particularly abstract, greater precision can be achieved by enumerating a 
specific conduct. Such is the case with the crime conceived of in this paper; 
the harm may be quite varied, and difficult to pinpoint, however, we tether 
this harm to a precise act, that of lying. There is of course an unavoidable 
inherent indeterminacy in every law; this, however, must be minimized to 
the greatest extent that is practically feasible. 
Precisely because of the looming danger of legal overreach and 
overcriminalization, where it may be socially advantageous to expand the 
law, legislators must go to great lengths to ensure that the scope of the law 
is defined as narrowly as possible. Even where such vagueness does not 
reach the level of the void for vagueness doctrine151 and constitute an 
                                               
149 Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) 
150 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). 
151 This doctrine, derived from the fifth and fourteenth amendment’s due process clauses, 
requires that all criminal laws must be drafted in language that is clear enough for the 
average person to comprehend. Jordan  v. De George, 341  U.S. 223 (1951) (“criminal 
statutes which fail to give due notice that an act has been made criminal before it is done 
are unconstitutional deprivations of due process of law.”). For Supreme Court decisions, 
see Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) (finding a Wage law as vague); 
Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927) (striking down an antitrust statute that failed 
to provide an ascertainable standard of guilt); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) 
(finding a law that completely prohibited picketing as void); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 
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infringement on due process, generality in the law should be avoided, 
particularly when dealing with harm of a somewhat imprecise nature. While 
the harm that results from murder is obvious (death occurs) and the harm of 
theft is unambiguous (property is unlawfully taken) the harm that may flow 
from certain malicious forms of lies is not as clear-cut. For this reason the 
conduct should be that much clearer. The cost of generality in the law is the 
high price of legal overreach and the danger of selective enforcement. 
Indeed, this is expressed well by the Latin maxim, misera est servitus ubi 
jus est aut incognitum aut vagum (“miserable is that state of slavery in 
which the law is unknown or uncertain”). 
There is also the issue of deterrence. For instance, it is socially 
advantageous to criminalize driving while intoxicated because of the harm 
that it has the capacity to cause. A drunk driver, however, could just as 
easily be charged with conduct causing (or potentially causing) serious 
injury or death to a person or damage to property. However, in order to 
delineate precisely which behavior is criminal (and thus hopefully deter this 
kind of behavior), the law stipulates a specific act that is closely identified 
with causing the harm. This is the case here; certain forms of lying can 
cause serious harm, thus we seek to make this behavior criminal so as to 
deter individuals from engaging in such conduct. Consider fraud crimes in 
the U.S. Code. Federal law relating to fraud crimes and false statements 
(U.S. Code §§ 1001—1040) identifies a slew of separate acts for which an 
individual may be charged with fraud, ranging from the certification of 
checks (U.S. Code § 1004), farm loan bonds and credit bank debentures 
(U.S. Code § 1013), to fraud and related activity in connection with 
obtaining confidential phone records information of a covered entity (U.S. 
Code § 1039), and even false pretenses on high seas and other waters (U.S. 
Code § 1025). Theoretically, this extensive list could be replaced with a 
single offence of fraud broadly defined. In fact, fraud itself could be 
categorized even more broadly as theft, and so on and so forth, on up the 
scale of generality until the entire U.S. Code is merely a single offence: 
“inflicting unjustified harm upon another.”    
Consider the mail fraud statute: the inclusion of the mail (or interstate 
carrier) aspect provides no appreciably meaningful aspect to the offense 
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other than specifying a precise act in which federal law may apply.152 One 
can find even greater specificity in the statutes. For example, the range of 
conduct that can be prosecuted under federal bankruptcy fraud is 
constrained considerably by the very precise conduct delineated by the 
statute.153 Another example is the computer fraud statute. Very specific acts 
such as browsing in government computers and the trafficking of passwords 
are outlined.154 By setting out specific conduct “prosecutors are prevented 
from broadening the scope of the statute to encompass any type of 
fraudulent conduct that merely happens to involve the use of a computer.”155 
The Model Penal Code likewise details a variety of specific criminal 
offenses for fraud, including “committing fraud in the course of running a 
business, using the credit card of another, and committing forgery.”156 The 
manner in which fraud crimes are segregated into an array of offences that 
detail very specific conduct speaks to the importance of specificity.  
 
Ideally, both the harm and conduct components of a crime should be 
defined as narrowly as possible. If, out of necessity, one side to this 
equation is vague, the remaining component should be that much more 
precise to minimize any ambiguity. Conduct and harm represent the two 
wings of legislative precision; if one is weak the other must be stronger so 
as to compensate.  Criminalizing certain forms of lying is a way to pinpoint 
and deter a particularly harmful form of conduct that slips through our 
present net of laws. 
 
 
 
II.   TOWARDS THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LYING: 
CONSTRUCTING THE CRIME OF EGREGIOUS LYING CAUSING 
SERIOUS HARM 
This paper is not proposing that all lies should be made criminal. In certain 
circumstances, the harm produced by a lie may be so great as to warrant 
criminal sanction, but this will not always be the case. The crime we are 
proposing is not one that stands on conduct alone, and does not derive from 
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deontological ethics.157 Degree of harm is the sole litmus test for criminal 
conduct. We must therefore look to the consequences of the act; in some 
situations, certain forms of deception are so patently egregious that they cry 
out to be criminalized. Having spent the first half of this paper making the 
case for criminalizing certain lies, the remaining half of this discussion will 
now deal with how such a crime may be constructed. Feinberg’s work on 
the harm principle is instrumental in helping us do this. 
 
A.   Proposed Circumstances where Lies should be Made Criminal 
Among legal scholars tackling the issue of lies and the law, Sissela Bok 
wrote the seminal text.158 She notes that lying is a particularly difficult 
subject to grapple with as it embodies moral ambiguities that are not easy to 
resolve.159 Since lying pervades every aspect of our lives, it has become 
ethically acceptable in some circumstances but yet still reproached in others. 
Bok observes that there are multiple reasons why people lie—we may do so 
in order to gain power, get out of trouble, save face, or avoid hurting 
another.160  As a general starting point, people should avoid telling lies; they 
are to be given an initial negative weight and when presented with a choice, 
one should always seek the truthful alternative.161 This assumption is based 
upon the harm that lying produces. Lies have the two-pronged effect of 
harming the victim of the lie immediately and harming society in the long 
term through the erosion of trust and cooperation.162 It would appear that 
lying and related forms of deception are normal rather than abnormal 
behavior—lying is a commonplace feature of our society. The difficult task 
therefore, is demarcating the fine line between lies that are acceptable and 
those that are (clearly) not.  
It has already been submitted that it would be administratively and legally 
impossible to criminalize all forms of lies and deceitful conduct, nor would 
this necessarily even be desirable. Such a position is not being advocated 
here. One of the purposes behind the criminal law after all, is the 
maximization of society’s general welfare and functioning. This is one of 
the reasons why alcohol (a contributing factor to domestic violence, 
depression, and general crime) is not illegal and why the speed limit for 
vehicles is set at x mph when a speed limit of less-than-x mph would really 
                                               
157 It is important to emphasize again that it is not the lie/act itself which is being 
prosecuted but rather the act in combination with the intent to cause egregious harm where 
harm results.  
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be preferable and would actually reduce accidents and deaths.163 At a certain 
point, the law makes the conscious (or perhaps unconscious) decision of 
allowing individuals to pursue activities which may be harmful to some 
degree because the total prohibition of said activity may set back general 
happiness and welfare far more than the allowance for that activity. In the 
end, it is a balancing act. Tobacco use, for instance, is not illegal, however, 
smoking is regulated in terms of the age of who can smoke and where they 
can smoke. Because we live in a pluralistic society with competing notions 
of right and wrong, the criminal law cannot be fitted to match moral 
condemnations of lying.  
Conversely, however, the sheer prevalence of lying in society does not 
necessarily make it correct or acceptable conduct. The fact that lying has 
become a habit for some, and is implicitly and silently condoned in certain 
contexts should not shield it from the criminal law and lessen any penalties 
associated with that behavior in other contexts. Unlike certain substantive 
crimes like murder and burglary, where the act invariably produces a 
negative result for the victim, lies are a very different animal: in order for a 
lie to take effect, it requires interaction between the liar and the victim, and 
that interaction can take a variety of different forms. And herein lies the 
crux behind the law’s indifference and hesitation to prosecute liars: there is 
a vast range of motivations behind lies and the interaction between the liar 
and the “lied-to” takes on very different manifestations so that it renders the 
task of pinpointing just exactly which types of lies are criminal and which 
are not extremely difficult. What we need then is a way to classify various 
types of lies so we may single out those that may justifiably be made subject 
to criminal sanction.  
 
B.  Classifying Lies  
American legal scholar Steven Morrison has developed a useful 
classification of lies; he believes that not all lies are created equal in that 
there are degrees of seriousness. His classification of six types of lies 
ranging in order from the most serious (and least justifiable) to least serious 
(and most justifiable) are: 1) lies that harm another person or entity; 2) lies 
that benefit the liar; 3) lies that benefit another person or entity; 4) lies that 
avoid harm to the liar; 5) lies that harm only the liar and 6) lies that are 
designed to avert harm to another person or entity.164  This continuum 
serves as a particularly helpful breakdown of different types of lies as it 
shows that a single law cannot be designed to deal equal treatment to them 
all.  Morrison goes so far as to state that if the role of the criminal law is to 
maximize society’s happiness and safety as well as achieving efficiency, 
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then lies 2) to 6) should not be criminalized.165 If a lie confers a benefit 
and/or reduces a harm for anyone, it should be encouraged and even 
celebrated.166  
It is clear from Morrison’s classification scheme that not all lies are 
identical in terms of the harm they produce. Thus, lying should not be 
criminalized generally save for very exceptional, narrow circumstances. 
Indeed, we must proceed with extreme legislative caution. Every effort 
should be made to delineate minimally the context in which lies can be 
made criminal. It is submitted here that only lies that are intended to cause 
serious harm and where said harm results should be criminalized.  
While many might make the (rather grand) assumption that everyone to 
whom a statement is directed has a right to know the truth, the criminal law 
cannot be so generous in this assumption and render criminal every type of 
lie. Morrison’s classification of lies is particularly useful here in 
determining which type of lies may be justifiably criminalized. It may 
appear to be a matter of controversy to deliberate on the notion that not 
everyone has an equal right to know the truth, but the fact of the matter is 
that certain lies can be tempered or justified by outstanding moral 
advantages in terms of the lie’s positive consequences. To use Kant’s 
example again of the murderer who arrives at one’s doorstep inquiring into 
the whereabouts of his intended victim, very few people would contend that 
the murderer has a right to know the truth, and most would have no moral 
qualms about lying to the murderer. The Nazi officer does not have a right 
to know that Jews are sheltered in the attic. Most would likely agree that 
lying here would be the “right” course of conduct. This is a lie that fits 
neatly into Morrison’s sixth category: lies that are designed to avert harm to 
another person or entity. This is the most benign class of lies.  
Consider a heavy smoker who slightly underrepresents her consumption of 
cigarettes to her doctor. In Morrison’s classification, this would be a fifth 
category lie: a lie that harms only the liar. This is relatively harmless (in 
terms of harming others). Suppose you are approached by a thief who 
demands that you hand over your wallet, and you assert that you do not 
have the wallet on your person (when in fact it is), again, as in the case of 
the murderer, most people would not shower the liar with criticism as our 
baseline assumption and belief is that the thief does not have a right to know 
the truth. This type of lie would fall into the fourth category: lies that avoid 
harm to the liar. This lie is justifiable. Now consider the case of a doctor 
who conceals from a sick patient the death of her beloved daughter. Here, 
while the probable gain from the lie is very real, it is counterbalanced by the 
seriousness of the lie. The decision to lie in this case would not be an 
obvious or easy choice and most people would think very carefully before 
perpetrating the lie. This is a category three lie: one that benefits another 
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person or entity. The reason that this type of lie becomes more difficult to 
justify is because our instinctive reaction points to the fact that the other 
person has a right to know the truth and make deliberations on his own 
accord—to strip this away is, in a sense, to perpetrate a greater harm. A 
category two lie, one that benefits the liar, would include examples of where 
one whips up outlandish lies about his background and credentials to other 
guests at a function. While no direct harm is done unto the victims, by 
projecting a hyped-up image of herself, the liar here in essence deprives the 
victims of formulating their own independent perspectives on the speaker, 
itself a kind of harm.167  
And lastly, the class of lies that are the most serious according to Morrison 
are category one lies: those that directly harm another person or entity. This 
is the type of lie perpetrated by Bartley in the introductory paragraph, and is 
the least justifiable. And so it would appear that from a bare, instinctive 
level, lies in categories two through to six—lies born of self-
aggrandizement, paternalism, self-protection and altruism—do not 
necessitate the sanction of the criminal law (where category six lies may 
even be encouraged in some circumstances), while lies that fall under 
category one may and should be criminally sanctioned.  
 
C.  Egregious Lying Causing Serious Harm: The Elements of the Crime 
With all this in mind, let us now lay out the precise elements of our 
proposed crime. The actus reus of the crime of egregious lying causing 
serious harm may constitute explicit communication of a lie in speech or 
written form where actual harm results. The mens rea will be specific intent 
(not recklessness or negligence) with reasonable foreseeability of serious 
harm. 
The statute could be framed in the following manner: 
A person is guilty of egregious lying causing serious harm when 
he knowingly lies to another person: (1) with the intent to cause 
serious harm to that person; and (2) serious harm occurs as a 
result of the lie. As used in this section, a "lie" means a false 
statement made to another person in oral or written form. 
The elements of the crime thus has four components. In terms of the actus 
reus, the state is required to prove that (1) the individual made a false 
statement to another person, and (2) serious harm resulted to that person as a 
result. The mens rea requirement is that (1) the individual made the false 
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statement knowingly, and that (2) the individual intended to cause serious 
harm. It is not necessary, however, that the exact harm which occurred was 
specifically intended; it is enough that harm of that degree of seriousness 
was intended generally as a result of the lie. 
The exact punishment applicable to the offence would have to be decided 
upon by the legislature and the courts. This could range from a simple fine 
to actual imprisonment depending upon the seriousness of the harm 
produced. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to define the exact 
meaning of “serious harm.” Lying that is intended to cause severe 
psychological injury or mental distress as exemplified by the example of 
Bartley in the introductory paragraph would constitute an appropriate 
starting point. But one can conceive of numerous other scenarios in which 
significant injury results from an intentional lie—for instance, loss of 
opportunity as evident in several of the other examples of malicious lying 
depicted in the outset of the discussion. Of course, allowing for loss of 
opportunity to constitute “serious harm” could run into the slippery slope 
arguments stated above, and additionally could also create overlap with 
various fraud statutes which criminalize deception that causes a loss (of an 
economic nature). Again, this simply goes to illustrate that the exact 
meaning of “serious harm” will be difficult to define with precision and 
would best be left to case law to be better sharpened and refined.  
At this point, it is important to emphasize that it is lying in written and 
spoken form which is to be criminalized, and not misrepresentation or 
misleading statements (whether acts or omissions). This is because lying 
constitutes a subset of deception. Deception involves a much wider range of 
behavior that can encompass an unlimited variety of means and devices by 
which the deceiver can generate false impressions on others’ minds. To 
criminalize deception in general would be to cast a far too wide a net that 
would invariably run the risk of legislative overbreadth. For this reason the 
elements of the crime are precise, and require that the offender overtly lied, 
and in lying intended to cause harm, and that harm actually occurred. This 
last component further limits the scope of the offence by making it 
impossible to charge an individual with an attempt under this crime. 
 
D.  The Distinction Between Lying and Deception 
Thus, while the crime of egregious lying concerns lies in spoken or written 
form, it distinguishes between this and that of general deception. There are 
practical considerations underlying this that should be briefly discussed 
here. As we stated, criminalizing the act of lying might very well walk the 
courts into a legislative minefield in terms of adjudication. It is therefore 
essential to narrow the scope of such legislation to include only the most 
egregious forms of lying narrowly defined. Lying is a largely unambiguous 
act. Deception, on the other hand, comes in a variety of forms; it can 
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involve the making of false statements, asking a question, statement of 
opinion, placement of objects, issuing a command, or engaging in various 
other kinds of verbal and non-verbal behavior. A famous example of a 
deception that does not involve a lie per se imagined by Kant is one where 
A deceives B into believing that he is headed on a journey by packing a 
suitcase and leaving it for B to see, hoping that B will draw the intended 
conclusion.168 If John knows that he was in London on Valentine’s Day but 
tells Mary that he was “either in London or Cambridge that night”, he has 
certainly deceived Mary by leading her to assume that he either does not 
know or is uncertain about his whereabouts on that day. While he is being 
deceptive, he has not necessarily lied as his statement can be construed as 
literally true.  
Some legal philosophers like Stuart P. Green assert that misleading will 
always be less clearly a malicious act than lying due to the principle of 
caveat auditor which avows that in certain circumstances, the listener bears 
the responsibility for confirming the truthfulness of a statement before it is 
taken to be the truth. 169 Unlike those who are lied to, the deceived is partly 
an architect in his own deception. Although confronted with misleading 
evidence, he is nonetheless free to draw conclusions of his own choosing (if 
he should draw any at all). This presence of an “invitation to draw 
inferences” is a crucial distinguishing factor between lies and non-
communicative deception.  
When dealing with general deception broadly defined, we are wandering 
into murky terrain. It may not always be clear where such deception has 
even occurred. Thus, an overt verbal lie offers itself up as a concrete, 
unambiguous action that may be narrowly targeted. To open the offence up 
to deception in general would be to at once jettison the important element of 
preciseness, without which the risk of judicial overreach (not to mention the 
logistical hurdles in proving the actus reus) would simply become too great. 
It is primarily for this reason that the crime conceived of here is limited to 
overt, unambiguous lies, written or oral, unlike the offence of fraud, which 
allows for more general deceptive forms of conduct.  
It should now be clear how useful Morrison’s classification of lies is to the 
present discussion; the crime of egregious lying proposed here exclusively 
targets lies of a category one nature under Morrison’s hierarchy—lies that 
harm another person or entity. However, even within this class, not all lies 
of this kind necessarily call for criminal punishment. As we have noted, the 
lie must be of a particularly serious nature. The proposed scope of the crime 
advocated here is thus extremely narrow—only a very limited number of 
extremely egregious acts would be subject to criminal sanctions. This 
hinges upon the seriousness of the harm produced by the lie. However, 
having established what kinds of lies should be subject to criminal liability 
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(i.e. ones that create serious harm to another person), we must now clarify 
exactly what degree of harm is needed to elicit such sanctions. To be sure, 
not all lies of even a category one nature should be criminalized—only lies 
that cause significant injury to another individual. What is left for us to do is 
to set out precisely the degree of harm required to trigger criminalization. 
To do this, we turn to Feinberg.  
 
 
E.  Finding the Correct Balance: Feinberg’s Mediating Maxims and the 
Criminalization of Lying 
While Morrison’s classification is extremely useful in delineating different 
types of lies, its usefulness stops here as it fails to explain precisely what 
level of harm is needed to trigger criminal sanctions. While the example of 
Bartley was fashioned with the intent to provoke a negative reaction 
regarding Bartley’s conduct, one can conceive of numerous instances where 
lies that harm another person should clearly not be made criminal. Husbands 
lie to their wives about their whereabouts when in fact they are having 
affairs; friends help friends cover up their drug or gambling addictions 
(which in the long run may harm the very people they are protecting); 
everyday gossip at school and in the workplace can lower self-esteem and 
create discomfort. These lies all produce harm; however, they should not be 
criminalized, as the harm they produce is not of a serious enough nature to 
warrant such an extreme response. The question then becomes: what degree 
of harm should trigger criminal sanctions? How serious does this harm have 
to be? Where can a conceptual line be drawn between reasonable criminal 
protection and the court wildly overstepping its bounds? It is essential that 
we pinpoint the correct balance between these two extremes.  
Joel Feinberg offers the conceptual framework that may guide us in making 
such an assessment. How we may demarcate between the classes of harms 
with which the criminal law is concerned and those that the law can safely 
ignore is something Joel Feinberg attempts to resolve.170 This is born out of 
his overarching project to find a general answer as to what sorts of conduct 
the state may rightly make criminal.171 As a nod to John Stuart Mill, 
Feinberg states:  
Generalizing then from the clearest cases of legitimate or proper 
criminalization, we can assert tentatively that it is legitimate for 
the state to prohibit conduct that causes serious private harm, or 
the unreasonable risk of such harm, or harm to important public 
institutions and practices. In short, state interference with a 
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citizen’s behaviour tends to be morally justified when it is 
reasonably necessary (that is, when there are reasonable grounds 
for taking it to be necessary as well as effective) to prevent harm 
or the unreasonable risk of harm to parties other than the person 
interfered with. More concisely, the need to prevent harm (private 
or public) to parties other than the actor is always an appropriate 
reason for legal coercion.172  
While the harm inherent in the class of crimes involving homicide, forcible 
rape, battery and aggravated assault is clear, the “harm principle” is 
designed to guide legislators along in deciding whether to criminalize 
conduct that is more “fuzzy.” Where John Stuart Mill argued that the harm 
principle is really the only determinative principle which justifies invasions 
of liberty, so that conduct which falls short of satisfying its terms cannot be 
made criminal,173 Feinberg contends that the harm principle must be 
considered alongside and aided by supplementary criteria or “mediating 
maxims.”174 According to Feinberg, while the harm principle is a valid 
legislative principle and serves as a useful starting point, it is not sufficient 
on its own and must be modified by other criteria.175 Taken in conjunction 
with Morrison’s classification of lies, Feinberg’s mediating maxims provide 
a clear set of parameters upon which we may construct the crime of 
egregious lying. 
 
1.  Not just Annoyances 
One mediating maxim is that in order to warrant legal coercion to prevent 
certain conduct, the magnitude of the harm must be great and stand beyond 
the mere annoyances, hurts, offences and inconveniences that come with 
life, as “clearly not every kind of act that causes harm to others can rightly 
be prohibited, but only those that cause avoidable and substantial harm.”176 
Unpleasant sensations and unhappy (though not necessarily harmful) 
experiences can be divided into two categories: those that hurt and those 
that offend.177 Feinberg attempts to draw a distinction between genuinely 
harmful conditions and all the various unhappy and unwanted physical and 
mental states which fail to constitute states of harm, as “these experiences 
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can distress, offend, or irritate us, without harming any of our interests.178 
The legal maxim De minimis non curat lex (“The law does not concern 
itself with trifles”) supports this mediating maxim, as it is thought that 
interference with the trivial will actually cause more harm than it prevents. 
Indeed the drafters of the Model Penal Code stated plainly the importance of 
what they called the ‘de minimis principle’—that trifling wrongs should not 
be the subject of the law.179 This is generally consistent with the stated view 
in this thesis—that the magnitude of the harm created by the lie must be 
great and not be mere hurt or distress. This paper does not contend that all 
lies should be made criminal; criminality should be confined entirely to lies 
that cause substantial harm.  
 
2.  Risk vs. Probability of Harm 
Another mediating maxim is that the legislator must be alert to the risk of 
the harm. This is a combination of the magnitude and the probability of the 
harm.180 Feinberg uses the example of the act of shooting a rifle randomly in 
the air: while there is negligible inherent value in the act (save perhaps for 
some diversionary value to the shooter), this must be balanced against the 
substantial risk (low probability but high magnitude of harm) that the act 
creates.181 On the other hand, the risks taken by ambulances in driving past 
the speed limit and ensuring expeditious delivery of patients to hospitals is 
justified by the greater social value of that conduct.182 If we combine this 
mediating maxim with Morrison’s categorization of lies, it is evident that 
while it can be said that there is some social value in category six lies (lies 
to the murderer), it is more difficult to offer a justification for category one 
lies. It is difficult to imagine that lies which harm another person or entity 
(without any corollary benefits) would have any inherent value (save a 
morbid pleasure for the liar). Additionally, there is substantial risk in this 
conduct as compounded by high probability and high magnitude of harm 
(high probability because the chance of a lie being believed and relied on by 
the victim is far greater than that of a rifle hurting a bystander when shot 
randomly into the air). Therefore, only category one lies should be made 
criminal.  
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3.  Aggregative Harms 
Directly related to the above maxim is another consideration for the 
legislator—that of aggregative harms. Lawmakers must consider the general 
harm that allowance for a certain conduct may create alongside specific 
instances of the conduct that can themselves actually be innocuous.183 
Alcohol consumption is a good illustration of Feinberg’s point here. It is not 
a bone of contention that more harm overall is created by alcohol 
consumption than would occur if it were made illegal. But should alcohol be 
banned across the board, the vast majority of people who do control their 
consumption levels and who do behave responsibly while drinking will be 
deprived of their innocent pleasures.184 It would be unfair that everyone 
should have their privileges stripped away simply because a few others 
behave badly. Those who would strongly oppose the idea of criminalizing 
lying may utilize this maxim in contending that lying should not be 
criminally prosecuted given that the vast majority of lies are harmless and 
innocent. This argument would have sway if it was the contention of this 
paper that all lies should be criminalized but far from being its thesis, this 
paper has strongly advocated for a clear demarcation of different types of 
lies so that only the most serious kind intended to cause egregious harm to 
another may even stand the chance of facing criminal sanction. While 
alcohol consumption has some social value for the vast majority, it is not so 
evident that lying with the intent to cause egregious harm to another 
engages a recognizable and justifiable pleasure that can outweigh the 
deprivation of this “pleasure.” In comparing the relative importance of 
conflicting interests, it would be difficult for one to justify why A’s interest 
in telling the lie would be greater than B’s interest in being protected from 
the lie.185 It is clear then that the general tenor of this paper and the call for 
criminalizing lying in certain contexts coheres generally with the harm 
principle, and more specifically, with Feinberg’s mediating maxims.  
Together, Morrison and Feinberg provide ample theoretical guidance to 
structure the crime of egregious lying. Morrison’s classification of lies 
identifies the type of lies that may trigger criminal sanctions—lies that harm 
another person or entity. Feinberg’s mediating maxims then further refine 
this category by pinpointing the exact level of harm that is required by 
considering its degree, probability, and the aggregate cost-benefit of 
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185 One possible way that a category one lie may be justified is if the motivation behind the 
lie is not purely to harm another but is combined with the motivation say to avert harm to a 
third party or to a third party. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss how a 
combination of different motivations may shift the categorization of lies in terms of 
seriousness and justifiability but this is a point that cannot go ignored.  
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targeting that harm. This framework allows us to narrow the scope of the 
offence to a particular conduct resulting in a very specific level of harm.  
 
F.  The Criminal Law or Tort: Which can provide better Redress? 
The last point we should address is a general one: broadly speaking, is the 
criminal law even the most appropriate venue in which to deter individuals 
from engaging in this type of conduct? Are there other less intrusive ways to 
do this other than through the heavy-handed force of the criminal law? It is 
important to note that the legal system currently operates on two very 
distinct sets of rules designed largely to achieve the same goal—that is, 
deter people from harming others by imposing costly sanctions. To achieve 
this end, we have both civil and criminal law. The punitive element within 
civil law is evident in the use of punitive damages for conduct that is 
particularly egregious and displays either a malicious intent, gross 
negligence, or a willful disregard for the rights of others. Some may contend 
that the criminal law is not the correct forum to address certain types of 
misbehavior as they advocate for a shrinking rather than an expansion of the 
criminal law as discussed above.186 The reasoning behind this is the concern 
that a gradual expansion of the criminal law would inevitably latch onto 
behavior that does not require or deserve criminal punishment.  
There is validity to this view. At the same time, however, there is a very real 
danger that the civil tort system “under-punishes” and fails to provide 
adequate redress for the wrongs that people commit. The reasons that the 
crime imagined in this paper should be addressed by the criminal and not 
merely the civil law system are three-fold: the criminal law delivers real 
sanction that the civil law does not; shame and stigma accompany criminal 
punishment; and criminal prosecution is not dependant on a willing victim 
to pursue punishment.  
As Robert Cooter explains, in its classic operation, the civil law “prices” 
while the criminal law “sanctions”.187 While the criminal law is fashioned to 
ensure that certain types of behavior cease completely, the civil law is really 
more concerned with pricing people out of that very behavior; the civil law 
does not want to stop people from driving—its goal is just to put an end to 
reckless and dangerous driving.188 The criminal law then has the unique 
ability to assign blame and censure with a moral force that the civil law 
cannot. It effectively sends the message that it is prohibiting behavior which 
lacks any social utility. Moreover, the criminal law often metes out 
punishments much higher than damage costs issued in civil law. Suppose 
Bartley’s goal was to aggrieve and cause severe harm: the victim may sue 
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Bartley in tort, but if the latter’s main goal was achieved and he does not 
mind paying compensation, then he will be largely unaffected by civil law 
sanctions. If Bartley were extraordinarily wealthy, a civil decision would 
provide little deterrent effect—this may just be the price of the “great fun” 
of psychologically torturing another individual, or destroying their life.  
Crime is also seen as a moral fault and carries with it the weight of shame 
and stigma that the commission of a tort simply does not.189 After all, 
accusing one of being a criminal is much more of an assault on her character 
than accusing her of being a tortfeasor. Shame and stigma also have an 
added deterrent value that the civil law lacks. Additionally, victims may not 
have sufficient resources to prosecute and chase after offenders; the 
defendant may be judgment-proof (e.g. the defendant is insolvent), giving 
little incentive for the victim to bring the defendant to civil court. Under the 
criminal law system where the state initiates proceedings, these problems 
can largely be assuaged as victims do not have to be concerned with the 
costs of proceedings, the defendant’s financial state, and the general “risk” 
of going to trial.  
It should be noted that all of these reasons are again consequentialist in 
nature—deterrence being its overarching objective. Conduct capable of 
causing serious injury to another should not be confined solely to civil law 
penalties. It is well and good for the act to have repercussions in tort; 
however, it should also have its due reflection in the criminal law, for it is 
here that such conduct may be properly sanctioned and an effective 
punishment meted out.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Some scholars believe that the current project of the criminal law should be 
to narrow its scope, avoid over-criminalization and lessen the penalties on 
behavior which is largely acceptable. While the ethos of this paper will 
sadly dishearten these scholars, the project as a whole should not disappoint 
those who want to know just under what circumstances lying may be 
criminalized, why one’s interest in being protected from harm can override 
another’s freedom to lie, and just how good of a reason the harm principle is 
as a justification for protecting one party from another. While there is really 
no clearly objective method for weighing the relative importance of 
conflicting interests and the degree to which their advancement or 
frustration can impact the agent, clearly a consequentialist approach that 
employs Feinberg’s reasoning not only justifies, but demands the 
criminalization of certain egregious forms of lying. If the function of 
criminal law is to prevent harm by deterring individuals from engaging in 
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certain forms of conduct, then our laws would be remiss to not make lying 
subject to criminal sanction in certain egregious cases.  
While there are very real benefits that accompany lying, and a blanket 
prohibition of the conduct would likely wreak havoc on all social 
interactions, there are yet very real distinctions between the various 
motivations driving the lie and, more importantly, the degree of harm that 
may result. Situated at the extreme end of the spectrum are genuinely 
problematic cases where the harm perpetrated on the victim is serious 
enough to warrant the proscriptive power of the law. The criminalization of 
lying within the private context would be a challenging case for any 
legislator, but it is submitted that in the very limited circumstances in which 
this crime can arise, the defendant really cannot claim any active interest in 
saying whatever it is they wish, especially when the interest of another in 
not being assailed is so great and—arguably more vital.  
